It was through the Hudaybiya Treaty (April 628) that the general concept of conquest, with its spiritual dimension of reaching out to hearts and minds, entered Islamic culture. Prophet Muhammad taught his Companions (Sahaba) that conquest could occur both through war and through preaching the message of the faith. He also indicated that the Byzantine and Sassanid empires were the two greatest obstacles to Islam, and thus targets for the umma (Muslim people) by saying: “If the Khosrau is destroyed, no Khosrau will follow, if Caesar is ruined, no Caesar will follow. Their treasures will be divided in Allah’s cause.”1 This hadith (saying of Prophet Muhammad) was interpreted to mean that both of these empires would submit to the Muslims. Similarly, in another hadith, Muhammad told the soldiers who were participating in the first maritime battle that all the sins of the first armed forces who set off to conquer the capital of Byzantine would be forgiven,2 thus emphasizing that there would be a long struggle for the city, which would require great patience and perseverance.3 Abdullah bin Amr bin As, one of the Companions who was allowed to record the sayings of Prophet Muhammad, explained that the idea of conquering Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, was emphasized on various occasions in the Prophet’s time: “We would take notes in the presence of the Prophet and record his ahadith [plural of “hadith”]. At one time one of us asked the Prophet, ‘Oh Messenger of Allah! Which will be the first to be conquered: Constantinople or Rome?’ He replied: ‘Heraclius’ city, Constantinople, will be conquered.’”4

Many ahadith from the early period and other Islamic texts indicate that those who participated in the siege of the capital of Byzantium would achieve great material and spiritual gains; this encouraged the Muslims living during the lifetime of the Prophet and soon after to focus on the conquest of Constantinople, adopting it as a sacred ideal that had to be realized. “Verily, you shall conquer Constantinople. What a wonderful army will that army be, and what a wonderful commander will that conqueror be.”5 This is the famous “conquest hadith,” the validity of which has been attested to by authoritative Islamic scholars of ahadith, such as Ibn Abdulbarr an-Namari (d. 1071), Muhammad az-Zahabi (d. 1348), Nuraddin al-Haythami (d. 1405), Jalaluddin al-Suyuti (d. 1505), and Muhammad al-Munawi (d. 1622).6 Hakim al-Nisaburi (d. 1014) brought together ahadith that met the criteria of authenticity set forth by Bukhari and Muslim in their ahadith compilations and which, despite this fact, had been excluded from their works, known as al-Jami al-Sahih (collection of authentic hadiths).7 Nisaburi recorded that the conquest hadith complied with the conditions of the two famous hadith scholars, and that it had actually been included in another work of Bukhari, al-Tarih al-Kabir (Great History).8

These types of ahadith, and especially the conquest hadith, frequently referred to concepts like conquest, war, and jihad; in addition, the Companions and the Muslims who came after them brought the conquest hadith to the fore as the most defining component of the motivation for the conquest of Constantinople.9 The exclusion of a hadith from the works referred to as the Kutub al-Sittah (Six Books), works that contain authentic ahadith, does not mean that the excluded hadith is not authentic; numerous ahadith have been considered sound in spite of their exclusion from these books. The authenticity of a hadith cannot be determined based on the book in which it is included; rather, authenticity is based on the situation and reliability of the narrator.10 A similar situation arises regarding the place of Istanbul in reports (akhbar) on the apocalypse as well as those on al-fitan wa al-malahim (sedition and fierce battles). These reports should primarily be considered and studied in terms of their authenticity, whether or not they are the result of revelation, and their consistency with historical events. They also should not be confused with reports that are found in classical sources but not included by hadith scholars in their compilations. Constantinople-related ahadith, in particular the conquest hadith, which are not mentioned as part of fitan and malahim hadith literature, started to appear in Ottoman sources long after the conquest of Constantinople.11

1- The Prophet Muhammad’s hadith about the conquest of Istanbul which was hanged in Ayasofya Mosque in 1697-1698.

Muslims had also set their sights on conquest of the Byzantine capital since the early centuries of Islam, due to its natural beauty, geographical position, and political and strategic significance. The war between Muslims and Byzantines, which started in the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad, continued during the era of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs, with the Muslims launching land and naval expeditions against Constantinople. After the fall of the Sassanid Empire in 642, the Byzantine Empire became the Muslims’ sole military target and faced the threat of destruction. In this context, the expeditions that were launched via two different routes, the inner regions of Anatolia and the coastline beneath the Taurus Mountains, referred to as the right-hand (high) road and the left-hxsdcand (low) road, respectively, wore down the Byzantine Empire and served as preparation for the sieges of Constantinople.12

While the Muslims, now aware of the need to form a naval force, were developing strategies for approaching Constantinople by land and sea, the Byzantines began to seek ways to keep the Muslims at bay and to protect and retain possession of their capital. When the conquest of Constantinople is compared to the rapid fall of the Sassanid Empire, it is important to note that Constantinople played an extremely important role in the survival of the Byzantine Empire.13

2- Before the silver grating made by Sultan Selim III, the sarcophagus of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari who <strong>attended the conquest of Istanbul and died there </strong>

Despite a number of military and political failures experienced by the governors of Syria, Caliph Uthman ordered that efforts continue to siege the Byzantine Empire, a persistent obstacle to the spread of Islam, from the east and the west. Thinking that it would be easier for Muslims to reach Constantinople from Europe, Uthman demanded that the efforts to conquer Spain be intensified.14 Following conquest of Cyprus with an agreement during the first naval expedition and the Dhat al-Sawari (Battle of the Masts), which took place off the coast of Phoenix in 655, superiority in the eastern Mediterranean passed to the Muslims. In this battle, which was the most important undertaking towards Constantinople, the Byzantine navy planned to encounter the Muslim navy far from the capital and destroy it; however, they were unsuccessful.15

The martyring of Uthman (656) by the rebels and the beginning of rifts on the matter of whether or not Ali should be the caliph led the Muslims to focus on their own internal matters, forfeiting the advantage achieved by the Dhat al-Sawari victory. While the Byzantine government made changes in the structure of the army, it also used the opportunity to take measures to protect Constantinople and its surroundings against external threats.16

When the Umayyads came to power in 661, the struggle between the Muslims and the Byzantine Empire continued from where it had left off; the first siege of Constantinople took place under the leadership of the Prophet’s Companion Fadala bin ‘Ubaid of Medina. Fadala, who had set off on a summer campaign in 668, began the campaign from a location west of Malatya (Hexapolis). With the help and support of Caliph Muawiya, Fadala reached Constantinople, spending the winter in Kadıköy. In early 669, Muawiya sent two auxiliary units, commanded first by Sufyan bin ‘Awf and then by Yazid bin Muawiya. These units included a large number of Companions, such as Abdullah bin Abbas, Abdullah bin Zubair, Abdullah bin Umar, ‘Awf bin Malik al-Asjai, Mahmud bin Rabi, and Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, the famous companion in whose home the Prophet stayed for a period of time after the Hegira to Medina—as well as many children of Companions. The siege continued for two years, ending in the autumn of 670.17

The battles in front of the city walls were unsuccessful. The entrance to the Golden Horn was closed off with thick chains, which prevented access to the city by sea. The severe winter conditions, which Arabs were not used to, the spread of diseases such as smallpox and fever in the army during the prolonged siege, and a shortage of supplies all meant that the conquest of Constantinople would not occur until a later date.18 This first siege resulted in significant losses for the Muslims; for example, Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, who believed that all Muslims in good health should participate in the siege, became ill and died after arriving in Constantinople with the auxiliary forces.19 There were seventeen additional deaths among the Companions alone, an indication of the magnitude of the Muslim losses. The graves and memorial sites of numerous Companions—Abu Ayyub al-Ansari’s in Constantinople in particular—have survived as reminders of this first siege.20

3- The Prophet Muhammad’s hadith about the conquest of Istanbul at the gate of Fatih graveyard

4- The Prophet Muhammad’s hadith about the conquest of Istanbul

5- The Prophet Muhammad’s hadith about the conquest of Istanbul hanged upon the wall on the right side of the entrance gate to the yard of Fatih Mosque upon a request by Idris al-Sanusi who visited Istanbul during the years of World War I.

6- Walls of Istanbul

Although the first attempt against them was unsuccessful, the Byzantines felt that their capital was under constant threat, and thus certain administrative and military measures were taken to better defend Constantinople. The city walls were strengthened and repaired; large war ships, with two decks, which could be used for the weapon Grejuva (Greek) Fire, where added to the fleet. Despite the difficulties, the Muslim Arabs continued with their struggle against the Byzantine Empire, trying to become accustomed to sea life, which was strange for them;21 they turned the Cyzicus (Kapıdağ) Peninsula, conquered in 670, into a base for expeditions to Constantinople.22 The threat against the city increased when the Muslims conquered Izmir (Smyrna) in 672 and reconquered Rhodes, transforming it into a military base as well (673). The strengthening of Kos and Chios further reinforced the Muslim’s dominance of the Mediterranean.23

The Muslim fleet, consisting of 1,700 vessels, which was prepared in the spring of 674 and docked at Akka (Acre), passed the Dardanelles (Hellespont) and anchored near the Golden Horn; when the troops were landed, the second siege of Constantinople began. In this siege, the Companion Fadala bin Ubaid al-Ansari was the commander-in-chief, while Abdullah bin Qays al-Harisi was the fleet commander and Junada bin Abu Umayya was the deputy fleet commander. Yazid bin Shajara ar-Rahawi undertook the command of the Damascene units. The Islamic army was divided into three groups. The first group consisted of those who fought in front of the city walls; the second group included the people who supported the first group with arms and equipment, while remaining at the back as an auxiliary force and joining the battle when necessary.24 The Seven Year Expedition, according to Byzantine sources, began with the conquest of the Cyzicus Peninsula in 670 and continued without respite with attacks from both land and sea in 674, finally coming to an end in 678. However, due to the Muslims’ failure to breach the fortified city walls from the land, and the fact that a significant portion of the Muslim fleet had been destroyed by Greek fire, the city was saved.25 The great losses of the fleet, which had retreated and been caught up in a storm along the Pamphylia coast, and the concurrent major losses encountered by the Muslim army in Anatolia, led to a further delay in the conquest of Constantinople. G. Ostrogorsky noted that the progress by Muslim Arabs in Eastern Roman territory, where they faced serious resistance for the first time, was brought to a halt by Byzantine victory won there; he went on to state that this achievement, which saved Europe from being engulfed by the Muslim wave, saved not only the Byzantine Empire, but all of European culture.26 Hence, the failure to conquer Constantinople was the greatest obstacle to the spread of Islam into Europe, and it also prevented Muslims, who by now dominated a major part of Spain, from progressing any further.27

During the following period, the Byzantine Empire launched a counterattack, first securing Constantinople and its immediate vicinity and then rapidly taking measures to reassert its authority, which had been shaken, in Anatolia. With the ascension to the throne of the Umayyads (685), Abdulmalik bin Marwan, who had been able to prevent Byzantine inroads in Anatolia by paying large tributes every year, once having achieved peace in the nation and having restructured the government in accordance with the changing political and economic developments, resumed the battle between Islam and the Byzantine Empire. Walid bin Abdulmalik, who inherited a strong government from his father, appointed his brother Maslama as commander in the struggle against the Byzantines, and initiated the second great campaign to conquer Constantinople, started to develop policies to attain the goal set by the Prophet. The conquest of Haraclea (Ereğli), a border fortress that had strategic significance and that had been well fortified by Emperor Heraclius in 95 (713–714) against Islamic armies, was a major step in the third siege of Constantinople.28

Sulayman bin Abd al-Malik, who ascended the Umayyad throne in 715, continued his brother Walid’s efforts to conquer Constantinople. A group of scholars informed the caliph that Prophet Muhammad had stated that the conquest of Constantinople would be carried out by a caliph who was named after one of the prophets; the fact that none of the Umayyad caliphs before him had carried the name of a prophet influenced this decision.29 The Byzantine destruction and looting of Lattakia, located along the Hims coast, and the taking of some Muslim prisoners accelerated preparations.30

Caliph Sulayman held long consultations about the strategy to be employed for the conquest with his brother Maslama, whom he had appointed as commander, and with Musa bin Nusayr, the conqueror of Spain. Musa, who thought that the previous conquest strategies should be employed, declared that it would be inadvisable for Sulayman to remain in Jerusalem while sending an army to Constantinople, rather advising the caliph to head for Constantinople only after having completed a series of preparatory measures, such as taking control of the fortresses, granaries, and armories en route.31 At the same time, the famous conquest hadith was frequently mentioned during the commissioning of the expedition, and the storytellers in the army were trying to convince people to participate in the preparations for the expedition by reminding them of the Prophet’s ahadith related to the conquest of Constantinople.32

According to reports, Caliph Sulayman visited Dabiq, near Aleppo; this location was being used as a base for expeditions directed against the Byzantines. The caliph came personally to inspect the preparations for battle; the Islamic army, ranging between 50,000 and 100,000 troops, was seen off with a grand ceremony in September 715. The caliph’s son Dawud was among these troops. In order to show his determination to conquer Constantinople, the caliph swore an oath that he would not leave Dabiq until the Islamic army had entered the Byzantine capital; he ordered his commander Maslama not to return before having conquered the city or until he had received a new order.33

First Maslama traveled to Afik via Maraş and spent the winter there; in the spring the commander followed the old Byzantine military road through the western parts of central Anatolia, which led from Constantinople to Çukurova via Ammuriye. On the advice of Musa bin Nusayr, following a series of conquests, including of Sardes and Pergamum, the commander turned toward Abydos (Nagara Point) and lay siege to Constantinople by crossing through the Dardanelles to Thrace (August 716).34 The Islamic fleet, consisting of 1,800 ships under the command of Umar ibn Hubayra, was anchored across from the chains that sealed off the inlet of the Golden Horn, trying to provide support for the siege from the sea.35 The Byzantines thought that events would turn against them and offered to pay Maslama tribute if he withdrew. Maslama, who wanted to conquer Constantinople at all costs, declined the offer.36

The siege, which continued until the death of Caliph Sulayman (August 14, 717), went poorly for the Muslims in part thanks to the endeavors of Emperor Leon III, as well as the rough winter conditions, the failure to breach the city walls, and the inability to find a way to protect themselves against Greek fire. Despite shuttling back and forth between the Golden Horn, which had been sealed off with chains, and his soldiers, who were fighting in front of the city walls, and despite the constant influx of reinforcements from Caliph Sulayman, Maslama was unable to conquer Constantinople.37 After carrying out investigations, Umar b. Abdulaziz, who ascended the Umayyad throne after Sulayman, was forced to call off the siege due to his concern that the Islamic troops deployed in front of Istanbul were in such a state of disorder that the Byzantines could have annihilated them.38 A great many people had participated in this siege, hoping to be part of the army that the Prophet Muhammad referred to in such glorious terms; they included Muslims who gained fame in the battles the Umayyad Empire waged against the Byzantines in Anatolia. One of these important personalities was Battal Ghazi (Abdullah al-Battal), who was extolled as a great war veteran, saint, and legendary hero among the Muslims and Turks in particular. After the Muslims retreated, Emperor Leon III was credited as the person who had saved the Byzantine capital; indeed, he was perceived as the hero who not only had saved Constantinople, but also a significant part of Byzantine territory in Anatolia. In the earlier siege (699), Constantine IV had halted the Muslim Arabs in front of Constantinople’s city walls, but Leon III expelled them outright.39 This meant the salvation not only of Byzantium but also of the Christians in Europe; his success meant that Leon III deserved to be considered like the Miltiades, who gained fame for the Hellenic victory against the Persians in the Middle Ages.40

During the siege, with the permission of the Byzantine authorities, Maslama, although unable to conquer Constantinople, built a mosque and another building, known as Dar al-Balat, for prisoners.41 There are indications that this mosque continued to exist in later eras. al-Aziz Billah, a caliph of the Fatimid Empire, made a request to the Byzantine delegation, which came to sign the peace treaty, that a sermon be read in his name at this mosque.42 It is highly likely that the mosque in Constantinople that came onto the agenda once again during the reign of the Seljuk sultan Tuğrul Bey, is the place of worship constructed by Maslama during the third siege.43

The last part of Umayyad period, the Muslim Arabs were not able to reach the walls of Constantinople again, although the conquests of Anatolia continued after Maslama’s siege was broken. After a period of calm that lasted a few years, the struggle with the Byzantine Empire started up again with the battles of the Abbasid period. Mahdi, the third Abbasid Caliph, organized a major expedition to Constantinople in 782 in order to punish the Byzantine Empire, which had tried to take advantage of the internal disorder in the Islamic state. After the Islamic army under the command of the sultan’s son, Harun, reached Üsküdar, it returned with a peace treaty made with Queen Irene that included the condition that an annual tribute be paid.44 In the following period, expeditions to Anatolia continued. While some of these expeditions targeted the Byzantine capital, none of them reached it.45

After Romanos Diogenes IV, who was taken prisoner during the Battle of Manzikert, losing both his crown and his life (1072), Süleyman Shah, the son of Kutalmış of the Anatolian Seljuk Dynasty, conquered İznik and established the first Turkish state in Anatolia. The Turks progressed as far as the banks of the Bosphorus and started to directly threaten Constantinople. During the years following the Battle of Manzikert, Çaka Bey, commissioned by Alparslan with the conquest of Anatolia, was the first Turkish commander to be seen in front of Constantinople. Çaka Bey, who launched the first Turkish fleet on the open sea after the conquest of Izmir, signing a treaty of friendship with the Pechenegs, called the Turks who were in the service of the Byzantine Empire to his own army. He then took action to lay siege to Constantinople from land and sea. Emperor Alexios Komnenos allied with the Cumans (Kipchaks) and inflicted a serious defeat on Çaka Bey’s prime ally, the Pechenegs (April 29, 1091). Although Çaka Bey, who was unable to meet up with the Pechenegs, persisted in assaulting Constantinople, the Byzantine capital remained safe from the Turkish threat for an extended period of time.46

Particularly in the second half of the fourteenth century, during the reign of the emperors who followed Michael VIII Palaiologos, Constantinople became a city-state surrounded by walls; the people were more aware of the threat of Ottoman Turks and thus started to live with the worry that their city would be besieged. The first serious siege attempt was carried out by Yıldırım Bayezid, who aimed to conquer Constantinople in September 1394, thus outdoing not only the previous caliphs and sultans but also his ancestors.47 Bayezid was concerned that the Byzantine emperor would establish a Christian union between European states and, in this context, was worried about the future of activities of Ottomans in Rumelia; he besieged Constantinople by sea, using a fleet that came from Gallipoli and progressed up the Bosphorus, and by land, seizing the Galata side of the city and setting up catapults in numerous locations.48

This attempt by Yıldırım Bayezid to overthrow the city by using long-term blockade tactics and by increasing the violence of the sieges caused great worry in Europe as well as in Constantinople.49 Despite all his efforts, Bayezid I was unable to stop the aid that was being delivered to the people of Constantinople, who were in dire straits; following the Nicopolis victory, Bayezid expedited operations aimed at conquering Constantinople. Yahşi Bey, who had been commissioned by Bayezid, conquered Şile (1396) and put an end to the Byzantine presence in Asia. Bayezid had a fortified castle, known as the Anatolian fortress, built on the Anatolian side of the Bosphorus at the narrowest section of the straits in order to prevent any aid from reaching Byzantium via the Black Sea. Then he sent an envoy to Emperor Manuel II who, despite the low morale of the besieged subjects and the opposition of his inner circle, was resolved to defend the city and expected help from Europe. Bayezid demanded that the emperor surrender the city. Upon the emperor’s rejection of this offer, Bayezid intensified the blockade.50

The French cavalier Marshall Boucicaut—who had fought against the Ottomans in Nicopolis, been taken captive, and been released upon the payment of ransom—was able to break through the Ottoman blockade and reach Constantinople with a small force; his heroism created great joy and hope in the city. Manuel II had gone to Europe with Boucicaut to seek help (December 10, 1399). The lack of positive responses to Pope Boniface IX’s call to European countries to defend the Byzantine capital, except from France, caused Manuel II to lose all hope; thus he made concessions in exchange for the siege being lifted. He agreed to establish a Muslim neighborhood by allocating 700 houses to Muslims in Sirkeci, to allow the Ottomans to appoint a qadi who would judge any disputes involving the Turkish and Muslim population residing in the area as well as cases involving Muslims and Byzantines, and to make an annual tribute payment of 10,000 florins. Bayezid, who had no intention of lifting the siege (which had lasted approximately eight years), was obliged to rethink the situation when Timur entered Anatolia; in addition, the insistence of Vizier Çandarlı Ali Pasha, who was on good terms with Manuel II, that conquest would be difficult and would most likely lead to heavy casualties, helped to change Bayezid’s mind.51 J. W. Zinkeisen noted that Constantinople lost a significant proportion of its population during this long siege and that some of the people switched their allegiance to the Ottoman side in desperation.52

During the chaotic period that followed the defeat of 1402, the careful policies of Byzantine Emperor Manuel Palaiologos helped Byzantium to endure for some time longer. Musa Çelebi had gained the loyalty of the timar holders and sanjak governors in Rumelia and laid siege to Constantinople again in 1412. Many Christian princes, who opposed the Byzantine emperor, helped Musa Çelebi by deploying their forces to besiege the city from both land and sea.53 After being defeated by Palaiologos’s fleet, Musa Çelebi withdrew his navy to prevent any more losses; he continued his land assaults, but to no avail.54 After a counterattack was mounted by Musa Çelebi’s brother Çelebi Mehmed, who was in Amasya and was supported by the Byzantines, Musa Çelebi was forced to lift the siege of Constantinople.55

The penultimate siege of Constantinople began on June 15, 1422; Murad II, determined to conquer the city, refused a peace offer from Emperor Palaiologos.56 Supported by artillery, Turkish forces laid siege to the city walls that extended along the Marmara to the Golden Horn; Murad II took control of the entrances and exits to the city. The Ottomans intensified their attack on the city walls between Topkapı and Edirnekapı. A large wall was built between Altınkapı and Odunkapı to block artillery fire from the city. Weapons that had not been used in previous sieges were put to use, including a huge siege cannon. The siege, the main attack of which occurred on August 24 and which lasted approximately eleven weeks, was interrupted by the rebellion of Murad II’s younger brother, Mustafa. It is reported that during this siege Muslim holy men, such as Emir Sultan, also fought in the Ottoman army, which consisted of Janissaries and timar holders; the people of Constantinople struggled to defend their city with all their might. Surviving this penultimate siege was considered by the residents to be a miracle performed by the Virgin Mary, leading to great celebrations in Constantinople.57


1 Bukhari, “Fard al-khumus”, 8, “Ayman”, 3, “Jihad”, 157; Waqidi Kitab al-Maghazi, compiled by M. Jones, London: Oxford University Press, 1965-66, vol. 2, p. 460. Some scholars, such as Zahabi and Ibn Kathir, who examined the hadiths in this manner, included a chapter in their works on events that might occur in the future. The conquest of Constantinople was one of these events. For example, see Zahabi, Tarikh al-Islam, ed. Bashshar Awad Maruf, et al., Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 2003, I, 711.

2 Bukhari, “Jihad”, 93.

3 Ibn Majah, “Jihad”, 11.

4 Musnad, II, 176. Hakim al-Nisaburi noted that this hadith is sound and fulfills the conditions set out by Bukhari. al-Mustadrak ala al-Sahîhayn, ed. Mustafa Abdulkadir Ata, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyye, 1411/1990, vol. 4, p. 468.

5 Musnad, I, 176; IV, 335; Darimi, “Muqaddima”, p. 43.

6 Mehmed Esad Efendi, Değeri ve Tesiri Açısından Fetih Hadisi, prepared Necdet Yılmaz, İstanbul: Darulhadis, 2002, p. 87; Ali Yardım, “Fetih Hadisi Üzerine Bir Araştırma”, Diyanet İlmi Dergi, 1974, vol. 13, no. 2, pp 116-120; İsmail Lutfi Çakan, “İstanbul’un Fethi Hadisi”, Fetih, Fatih ve İstanbul Sempozyum Bildirileri, İstanbul: Seha Neşriyat, 1992, p. 50.

7 See, Hakim al-Nisaburi, al-Mustadrak, vol. 4, p. 468.

8 Bukhari, al-Tarikh al-Kabir, ed. Mustafa Abülkadir Ahmed Ata, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyye, 2001, vol. 2, p. 81.

9 The fact that people whose life histories are given in all the biographies, in particular that of Zahabi, are recorded as having partaken in the expeditions to Constantinople must be the manifestation of how differently this matter is evaluated in the Islamic world. For example, see: Zahabi, Tarikh al-Islam, vol. 3, p. 132, 174; vol. 4, p. 302.

10 Çakan, “İstanbul’un Fethi Hadisi”, pp 51-52.

11 For detailed information on this matter, see: Feridun M. Emecen, Fetih ve Kıyamet: 1453 İstanbul’un Fethi ve Kıyamet Senaryoları, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012, pp 30-78.

12 Waqidi noted that the Companion Busr ibn Abu Artat managed to come all the way to Constantinople during the summer expedition on which he set off in 43 (663–664), and that he returned after spending the winter in the city (see: Tabari, Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk, ed. M. Abu al-Fazl, Beirut: Dar Suwaidan, n.d., vol. 5, p. 181).

13 Bernard Lewis, “İstanbul’un Sükutu II”, tr. Orhan Şaik Gökyay, İstanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi, 1956, vol. 2, p. 190.

14 Tabari, Tarikh, IV, 255.

15 Marius Canard, “Tarih ve Efsaneye Göre Arapların İstanbul Seferleri”, tr. İsmail H. Danişmend, İstanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi, 1956, vol. 2, pp 215-217; Philip K. Hitti, İslam Tarihi, tr. Salih Tuğ, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1989, vol1, p. 253. The Muslim Arab threat to Sicily and Italy was one of the reason Emperor Constance II wanted to transfer the state capital to Sicily in 663.

16 Georg Ostrogorsky, Bizans Devleti Tarihi, tr. Fikret Işıltan, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1981, pp. 109-110.

17 Khalifa b. Khayyat, al-Tarikh, ed. Suhail Zakkar, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1414/1993, p. 159; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 232; Yaqūbi, Tarikh, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, Beirut: Dar Sadir, n.d. , vol. 2, p. 138.

18 Zahabi, Siyar A’lam al-Nubala, ed. Shuayb al-Arnaut et. al, Beirut: Muassasat al-Risala, 1981-85, II, 394; Yaqut al-Hamawi, Mu’jam al-Buldan, Beirut: Dar Sadir, n.d. , vol. 4, p. 347.

19 Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, who became ill and died during the siege, was buried outside the city walls at his request. The records of Ibn Abdirabbih indicate that Abu Ayyub had heard the Prophet state that “a good person will be buried outside the walls of Constantinople,” and this played a role in his insistence on being buried in that spot (al-Iqd al-Farid, ed. Abdulmajid al-Tarhini], Beirut : Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1987, vol. 5, p. 116).

20 For detailed information, see: Necdet Yılmaz and Coşkun Yılmaz, İstanbullu Sahâbeler, İstanbul: Bilge Yayım Habercilik ve Danışmanlık, 2003.

21 Troops that were trying to reach Constantinople by sea used small boats, which could carry a maximum of ten people (see: Zahabi, A’lam, VI, 9).

22 The Kapıdağ Peninsula was fortified and turned into a winter base where preparations could be made for spring expeditions; this continued until the second siege was lifted (see: Zahabi, A’lâm, vol. 6, p. 413.

23 Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 5, p. 288; Ostrogorsky, Bizans Devleti, p. 115.

24 Agabiyus al-Manbiji, al-Muntakhab min tarikh al-Manbiji, ed. Omar Abdussalam Tadmuri, Tripoli: Dar al-Mansur, 1406/1986, p. 72.

25 Ibn Asakir, Tarikh Madinat Dimashq, ed. Omar al-Amri, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1415/1995-1418/1998, vol. 32, p. 119; Canard, “Tarih ve Efsaneye Göre”, pp. 223-224.

26 Ostrogorsky, Bizans Devleti, pp 116-117.

27 Lewis, “İstanbul’un Sükutu II”, pp. 191-192.

28 Tabari, Tarikh, VI, p. 492.

29 Mehmed Esad Efendi, Değeri ve Tesiri Açısından Fetih Hadisi, pp. 44-45.

30 Ya’qubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 299.

31 Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya, ed. Ali Abdussatir et. al., Kahire: Dar Ihya at-Turath al-Arabi, 1408/1988, IX, 182; Zahabi, Tarikh al-Islam, II, 1045-1046.

32 Musnad, I, 176; IV, 335; Ibn Asakir, Tarikh Dimashq, vol. 28, p. 315; Zahabi, Tarikh al-Islam, vol. 2, p. 312-313.

33 Khalifa b. Khayyat, al-Tarikh, p. 245; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 530; Ibn Asakir, Tarikh Dimashq, vol. 32, p. 46; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya, vol. 9, p. 181.

34 Nergisi, “Gazavât-ı Mesleme”, prepared by Kayhan Atik, postgraduate thesis, Erciyes University Social Sciences Institute, 1990, pp. 81-83.

35 Zahabi, Tarikh al-Islam, vol. 3, p. 132.

36 Zehebî, Tarikh al-Islam, vol. 2, p. 1047.

37 Zehebî, Tarikh al-Islam, vol. 2, p. 1045, Canard, “Tarih ve Efsaneye Göre”, p. 226.

38 Khalifab. Khayyat, al-Tarikh, p. 245; Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 6, p. 530; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya, vol. 9, p. 181; Ostrogorsky, Bizans Devleti, pp. 145-146.

39 Ostrogorsky, Bizans Devleti, p. 117.

40 A. A. Vasiliev, Bizans İmparatorluğu Tarihi, tr. Arif Müfit Mansel, Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1943, p. 300.

41 Ibn al-Fakih, Kitab al-Buldan, ed. Yusuf al-Hâdî, Beirut: Alam al-Kutub, 1416/1996, p. 145; Maqdisi, Ahsan al-Taqasim, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1877, p. 147; Zahabi, Tarikh al-Islam, vol. 2, p. 1108; K. Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio, ed. Gy. Moravcsik, tr. R. J. H. Jenkins, Washington : Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 1967, p. 93.

42 Zahabi, A’lam, vol. 15, p. 172.

43 Canard, “Tarih ve Efsaneye Göre”, pp. 231-234.

44 Taberî, Tarikh, vol. 8, pp.152-153.

45 Zahabi, A’lam, vol. 6, pp. 287, 297-298.

46 Osman Turan, Selçuklular Zamanında Türkiye, İstanbul: Turan Neşriyat Yurdu, 1971, p. 92-93.

47 16. Asırda Yazılmış Grekçe Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, ed. Şerif Baştav, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi, 1973, p. 101.

48 Hadîdî, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân, ed. Necdet Öztürk, İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Fen-EdebiyatFakültesi, 1991, p. 112.

49 İbn Kemal, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman, ed. Koji Imazawa, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000, vol. 4, p. 237.

50 Dukas, Bizans Tarihi, translated by Vl. Mirmiroğlu, İstanbul: İstanbul Fethi Derneği, 1956, pp. 30-31.

51 16. Asırda Yazılmış Grekçe Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, p. 101; Dukas, Bizans Tarihi, pp 29, 33; J. Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, translated by Nilüfer Epçeli, İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2011, vol. 1, p. 255. 

52 Zinkeisen, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, I, 213.

53 16. Asırda Yazılmış Grekçe Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, p. 110.

54 Zinkeisen, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, vol. 1, pp. 326-328. The Byzantines, whose military power was severely weakened, went outside the city walls to deter the Turks and to engage them directly. See, Dukas, Bizans Tarihi, p. 56;

55 Dukas, Bizans Tarihi,, pp. 56-57; 16. Asırda Yazılmış Grekçe Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, p. 111.

56 Dukas, Bizans Tarihi,, pp. 110-111.

57 For other relevant sources, see Paul Wittek, “İstanbul’un Sükutu V”, translated by Orhan Şaik Gökyay, İstanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi, 1956, vol. 2, pp. 204-212; Şahin Uçar, Anadolu’da İslâm-Bizans Mücadelesi, Istanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1990; Feridun M. Emecen, “İstanbul’un Fethi”, DİA, XXIII, 212-220; Mustafa S. Küçükaşcı, “Sahabelerin İstanbul Seferleri”, Aydos Kalesi ve İstanbul’un Fethi Sempozyum Bildirileri, Istanbul: Sultanbeyli Belediyesi, 2011, pp. 57-70; Mehmet Adıgüzel, “Emeviler ve Abbasiler Döneminde İstanbul Kuşatmaları”, postgraduate thesis, 2010, MÜ Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü; Halil İnalcık, “Bayezid I”, DİA, V, 231-234; Mücteba İlgürel, “Çaka Bey”, DİA, VIII, 187.

This article was translated from Turkish version of History of Istanbul with some editions to be published in a digitalized form in 2019.